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Administrative Law
After Forty Years

By MARSHALL J. BREGER*

of the federal Administrative Proscedure
we observe
anniversary
to
it is40th
appropriate
Act, the
reflect on the state of administrative law.
Practitioners of administrative law,
whether on the federal or state levels, have
to be Jacks and Jills of all trades. They
have to know the ins and outs of agency
adjudication procedures, including the
shifting constitutional boundaries of the
due process clause, of the newly centralized rulemaking procedures and the more
traditional challenges offered by ratemaking and licensing in a deregulatory
environment. They have to know how to
use the tools offered by laws like the Freedom of Information Act, Privacy Act, Government in the Sunshine Act, and others.
Moreover, appeals from agency action
require a thorough knowledge of the
ambiguous case law defining the scope of
judicial review. Finally, a good administrative lawyer must keep a close tab on how
executive task forces and legislative developments may affect agency operations, and
thereby the interests of his client. This is,
of course, the road map for the lawyers,
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the "nutshell" syllabus for the law school
course, but it's only the beginning. To really
succeed, the administrative lawyer must
master the substance of the regulatory
scheme and also know the corridors and
telephone directory of the agencies concerned. We sometimes forget how broad
this field is. After all, the fields of immigration, tax, energy, environmental, securities, labor, health, election, communications, banking, or antitrust law are simply
specialized applications of administrative
law. As such, I've long felt that administrative law belonged in the first year curriculum of all law schools.
The field of administrative law, of course,
predated the 1946 passage of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The first
important regulatory agency was the
Interstate Commerce Commission, set up
in 1887 to regulate the then-powerful railroad industry. The Federal Trade Commission followed in 1914, and other major
independent regulatory agencies covering
power, securities, labor, communications,
and aeronautics were creatures of the New
Deal. As early as 1916, ABA President Elihu
Root presciently stated, "If we are to continue a Government of limited power these
agencies of regulation must themselves be
regulated.... A system of administrative
law must be developed ... '" By the end
of the 1930's, sharp debates over the
appropriate role of administrative agencies were commonplace. Many legal groups
decried the exercise of combined legisla-

tive, executive and judicial power by these
agencies. President Roosevelt's Committee on Administrative Management in 1937
gave that sentiment a boost by stating that
the independent commissions "constitute
a 'headless fourth' branch of the Government" and by urging that they be abolished and absorbed into the Executive
Departments. This view was incorporated
into legislation known as the Walter-Logan
Bill of 1940, strongly backed by the ABA.
The bill passed both Houses of Congress
but was vetoed by the President, who felt
that the bill was motivated by "lawyers who
desire to have all processes of government
conducted through lawsuits and [by] interests which desire to escape regulation."2
On the other side was the extremely
thorough report in 1941 of the Attorney
General's Committee on Administrative
Procedure, which traced the complete history of the administrative agencies and
held that such agencies were necessary and
proper instruments of the federal government. The Committee's report concluded
that there were distinct "advantages of
administration as compared with executive action" and that "limitations on effective legislative action," and upon "exclusively judicial enforcement," as well as the
need for "organization to dispose of volume of business and to provide for the
necessary records" were ample "reasons
for resort to the administrative process."'
Eventually the Administrative Procedure
Act grew out of a compromise between
this Committee's proposed legislation and
that urged by the ABA. The APA, which
passed unanimously in 1946, accepted the
administrative agency concept and then
crafted procedural requirements onto it.4
The Act's signal accomplishments, which
have stood the test of time, include the
establishment of a firm legal status for
agency hearing examiners (now administrative law judges); creation of a simple,
open notice-and-comment procedure for
agency rulemaking; and adoption of the
substantial evidence rule in the judicial
review of adminstrative decisions based
upon records.
These aspects of the APA have allowed
it to remain a viable guide to agency action
today, when the 1985-86 U.S. Government
Manual lists fifty-seven independent
establishments and government corporations along with thirteen Cabinet Departments-all of which have significant regulatory responsibilities.
How has federal administrative law
changed in the four decades since passage
of the APA? In some ways it hasn't changed
much at all. Commentators and reformers, including those of us at the Administrative Conference, are still struggling to

streamline administrative proceedings,
define the appropriate level of policy articulation, reduce delays, develop uniform
rules of procedure, restate the scope of
judicial review, and devise better ways of
enforcing regulatory prescriptions. Moreover, some of the commentators are even
the same: The 1941 Attorney General's
Committee on Administrative Procedure,
which laid the groundwork for the APA,
was directed by Walter Gellhorn and staffed
by Kenneth Culp Davis, both of whom
remain leading professors and text writers
in the field and prominent members of
the Administrative Conference.
Nevertheless, much has changed in those
forty years. The sheer size of the bureaucracy and the number of agencies making
or enforcing laws has increased dramatically. One indication is that the number of
federal administrative law judges making
initial decisions in agency adjudications has
jumped from 196 in June 1947 to 1,121
in June 1984.' This growth in the administrativejudiciary is mirrored by a concomitant burgeoning in agency rulemaking.
In 1947 the Federal Register totaled 8,902
pages, while in 1985 it was 53,479, and this
was dramatically down from the 1980 highwater mark of 87,012 during the zealous
regulatory period of the Carter Administration.
Furthermore, the APA, which was nearly
the sole governor of agency behavior for
twenty years after its passage, has been
joined by a sheaf of new government-wide
procedural statutes in the following 15
years. First came the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in 1966 (significantly
broadened in 1974) which, along with the
1974 Privacy Act and 1976 Government
in the Sunshine Act, were codified within
the Administrative Procedure Act. These,
along with the Federal Advisory Committee Act of 1972 and the passage in 1980
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act and the
Paperwork Reduction Act, created many
new openness, public participation and
clearance requirements for agencies to follow and for litigants to invoke against the
government.
On the regulatory side, the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1970 (N EPA),
which required environmental impact
statements to be prepared on major federal projects significantly affecting the
environment, ushered in a regulatory era
in which appeals to courts from federal
agency actions multiplied and which saw
the passage of major health, safety and
environmental regulatory laws-often with
special procedural requirements attaching
to agency rulemaking and adjudicatory
procedures. Finally, concerns about overregulation led to Presidential Executive

Orders by Presidents Ford, Carter and
Reagan which progressively strengthened
the power of the Executive Office of the
President (through the Office of Management and Budget) to oversee executive
agency promulgation of new regulations
and to enforce cost-benefit analysis
requirements.
The Administrative Procedure Act, itself,
was primarily geared to prescribing the
procedures used for formal adjudication
and formal rulemaking. However, formal
rulemaking, a technique once used to prescribe standards, has now fallen into relative disuse largely due to the delay caused
by the cumbersomeness of employing formal evidentiary hearing procedures to
formulate rules of general applicability.
For example, the famous FDA peanut butter proceeding took over nine years to
resolve the issue of whether peanut butter
should contain at least ninety percent peanuts (as proposed by the FDA) or eightyseven percent peanuts (as proposed by
industry). A transcript of 7,736 pages was
generated. 6 These excesses led to informal
'notice-and-comment" rulemaking
becoming the primary device for agency
policy-making. However, "informal" rulemaking was also fast becoming a misnomer. It is doubtful that the "framers" of
the APA would have identified major rulemaking proceedings of the 1970's and
1980's as falling within the simple, threestep, notice-and-comment procedure
spelled out in Section 4 (now § 553) of the
Act. As outlined in the Act, the three steps
are (1) notice of the proposed rule, (2)
opportunity for submission of comments,
and (3) a "concise general statement of [the
final rule's] basis and purpose." Unfortunately, as agencies increasingly resorted to
rulemaking to make policy, critics in the
Executive, Legislative and Judicial branches
sought to interpose checks in the form of
new procedural steps, and notice-andcomment became merely a skeleton upon
which was hung other requirements such
as advance notices, OMB review of agency
proposed and final rules, opportunity for
cross-examination, agency responses to
comments, findings and reasons in the
statement of basis and purpose, supplemental comment periods, etc.
A 1972 report to the Administrative
Conference, surveying regulatory statutes
that required procedures in addition to
notice-and-comment for the adoption of
rules of general applicability, concluded
that the procedural provisions in these
statutes were "almost unbelievably chaotic" and that these provisions responded
to pressures for additional procedural
rights in a "totally ad hoc fashion."7 This
trend, which shows no sign of abating, has

contributed to what former Administrative Conference Chairman (now judge and
Supreme Court nominee) Antonin Scalia
referred to as the "balkanization" of
administrative procedure. One court, dismayed by the variety of statutory provisions, complained, that "[o]ne would almost
think there had been a conscious effort
never to use the same phraseology twice."9
We at the Administrative Conference
have urged Congress to refrain from mandating new procedures beyond notice-andcomment, 0 while we have also urged
agencies to use such additional procedures
voluntarily and selectively." It is a recurring struggle, and while we strive to protect the APA's pristine original intention,
we recognize that in today's more adversarial regulatory climate this portion of the
Act may, itself, be in need of some retooling. Moreover, the Act is old-fashioned in
another respect. Nowhere does the Act
address the now-common technique of
informal adjudication or alternative dispute resolution methods such as arbitration, mediation or negotiation.
Indeed, it is not surprising that the
administrative law "roadmap" has become
somewhat dated, since the terrain and the
climate have changed as well.
Administrative agencies used to be considered part of the "headless fourth branch"
of the government-somewhat of an illegitimate offspring. Now, however, there is
little debate over their legitimacy. Instead,
the leading issues pertain to how they
should be overseen and by whom, how
open they should be, what substantive
authority they should have, and how their
procedures can be streamlined. Moreover,
as might be expected, the institutionalization of agencies as power centers in the
federal government has led to what might
be called a subpractice of law in Washington, D.C.-influencing agency decisions.
Oversight
Far from being considered an illegitimate offspring, agencies are now fought
over by their "parent" branches of government. The above-mentioned Presidential Executive Orders on regulation have
resulted in a situation where the President
(through OMB) effectively controls the
policy-making of all Executive Branch
departments and agencies. Moreover, citing the Supreme Court's decisions outlawing legislative veto of agency rulemaking,
the Reagan Administration (supported by
an ABA Board of Governors Resolution
at the recent Midwinter meeting) 2 has
bruited the idea that independent agencies can rightfully be brought under the
sweep of these orders. " The district court
Federal Bar News & Journal

decision in the recent Gramm-Rudman litigation, in dicta, hinted its receptivity to
this view by noting that "[i]t is not as obvious
today as it seemed in the 1930's that there
can be such things as genuinely 'independent' regulatory agencies."' 4 However, the
Supreme Court in affirming the lower
court's decision took pains to add in a footnote that "no issues involving such [independent] agencies are presented here."''
In a sense, we have come full circle, with
new arguments coming to the fore that
independent agencies enjoy no particular
constitutional status and that all agencies
should be seen as within the Executive
Branch and thus subject to Presidential
control. Congress has said "not so fast."
Although it has been willing to grant OMB
sweeping power over all agencies' actions
involving paperwork (under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980), Congress
has shown increasing jealousy over "its"
independent agencies. Congress has
granted several of these agencies independent litigating authority and exemptions
from OMB clearance of legislative testimony, and various congressional committees have decried perceived OMB "interference" in agency regulatory initiatives.
This power struggle concerning the nature
of executive and legislative oversight of
agency policymaking is at bottom a constitutional law question-but it is one of
great significance to all practitioners of
administrative law.

unreasonable?" Indeed, as the ABA
Adminstrative Law Section's recent
attempts to parse the true meaning of section 706 shows, 17 courts have made use of
a variety of arrows in their quiver when
seeking to shoot down agency action.
Openness
And what of public oversight? The array
of openness laws in the 1970's has resulted
in a large window into agency activities.
Agency records are available, their advisory committees must meet publicly, collegial commissions must meet "in the sunshine," secret, ex parte, communications
to agencies about proceedings in progress
are questionable and often illegal, and top
agency officials have to disclose their
finances to the public. Has this openness
gone too far for the government's own
good? While, in most cases, administrative
law practitioners and students would agree
that the openness of the last fifteen years
has been largely beneficial (partly perhaps
because these same people are, after all,
in a sense, "consumers" of this "good"), a
bit of a backlash has begun to set in.

JudicialReview
Nor is the Judicial Branch completely
on the sidelines. Not only have federal
courts become arbiters of some of these
power-sharing disputes,judicial review of
agency action generally has assumed an
importance and regularity beyond imagination forty years ago. Rare is the major
agency regulation that escapes court challenge. Indeed, as the Administrative Conference has documented, "races to the
courthouse" have become frequent spectacles. "
In this instance, the APA provisions on
judicial review are only partially to blame.
Section 706 spells out a scope of judicial
review test that is, on its face, quite deferential. To be found unlawful, an agency
action must be either unconstitutional, ultra
vires, procedually unlawful, unsupported
by substantial evidence or "arbitrary,
capricious [or] an abuse of discretion."
Nevertheless, courts have not only opened
the doors to more litigants by limiting
standing, ripeness, and reviewability barriers, they have basically turned the section
706 test into one that can be summarized
as: "was the agency action reasonable or
September 1986/Volume 33 No. 7

The Administrative Conference, despite
a predominance of agency members, has
through the years been a bastion of openness, urging a stronger Freedom of Information Act, more disclosure of ex parte
communications in rulemaking and greater
public participation in all types of agency
proceedings. However, in recent years, the
Conference has warned against overly
inflexible application of the openness provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee
Act, urged greater protection of confidential business information under the FOIA,
and urged that the government in the Sunshine Act be loosened so as to allow agency
members to have preliminary discussion
of budgetary matters or legislative proposals in private." The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has taken this cue and
proposed restrictive amendments to its
sunshine procedures that provoked such
controversy within the legal community
that it decided to await the outcome of an

ABA Administrative Law Section Report
on the matter."
Alternative Proceduresfor Dispute Resolution
In administrative law, as in other branches
of law, there is a growing dissatisfaction
with the high costs of adversary procedures, both to agencies and the public.
Accordingly, agencies have become
increasingly interested in developing
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) techniques. Agencies have begun to use arbitration, mediation, mini-trials, telephone
hearings and other techniques to avoid the
strictures of formal trials to adjudicate some
types of cases. The Administrative Conference has been a leader in studying these
techniques and urging their use where
appropriate."'
In the rulemaking area, some agencies
have found that increasing contentiousness has prolonged proceedings and has
made court challenges to rules the norm
rather than the exception. To help meet
ths problem, the Administrative Conference in 1982 advanced the technique known
as "negotiated rulemaking." Under this
procedure, an agency faced with a regulatory problem brings together representatives of affected parties to negotiate a
rule in face-to-face meetings. Participants
in the negotiations have an incentive to
cooperate because of the savings if litigation can be avoided. Moreover, they know
that failure to achieve some consensus on
a proposed regulation will result in the
agency writing the rule itself. This experimental procedure offers the hope, at least
in some instances, of avoiding seemingly
endless court battles over agency regulations. It was our view that real dollars in
the form of transaction costs to both the
government and private parties could be
saved whenever a consensual solution could
be arrived at prior to the hardening of the
positions. Therefore, our original 1982
recommendation on negotiated rulemaking trumpeted this concept and suggested some guidelines for the convening
and conducting of such a proceeding. In
1985 we assessed the experience thus far.2'
We found that the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) have
pioneered the use of negotiated rulemaking, with notable success. The FAA
has used the technique to replace an outmoded regulation concerning flight and
rest time requirements for domestic airline pilots that was on the books for over
thirty years and that required thousands
of pages of interpretation. The negotiating committee assembled by the FAA consisted of representatives of airlines, pilot

organizations, public interest groups, and
other interested parties. The new rule simplifies the flight and rest time requirements. The FAA says that it permits more
flexibility in scheduling while ensuring that
flight crews receive adequate rest between
assignments. Thus far there has been no
challenge to the new rule in the courts.
A similar success story can be told about
the EPA. The EPA has adopted a negotiated rule on nonconformance penalties
for certain vehicles not meeting Clean Air
Act standards. A second negotiated rule
concerning emergency exemptions from
pesticide regulations is pending before the
Administrator of the EPA. The agency has
begun a third negotiated rulemaking proceeding aimed at protecting farmworkers
from unsafe exposure to pesticides.
Former EPA Administrator William D.
Ruckelshaus has said: "Conducting environmental business through attack and
counter-attack, suit and counter-suit, is
wasteful, expensive, and exhausting.""2
Though the negotiated rulemaking process is not appropriate for every regulatory problem, the experience of the FAA
and the EPA shows that "reg neg" can
sometimes work to reduce this waste and
expense. I believe that federal regulatory
agencies should be urged to encourage the
parties within their jurisdiction to collaborate in finding creative solutions to regulatory problems. The negotiated rulemaking experiment is showing that cooperation between the public and private sectors can pay valuable dividends in the form
of better government.
Conclusion
It is wise to remember that in administrative law, as in other fields of law, procedural tussles usually reflect disagreements over substance. This is as true in
the 1980's as in the 1940's. Questions concerning separation of functions, scope of
judicial review, openness and public participation, centralized executive oversight,
or the need for alternative techniques for
dispute resolution, usually are brought to
a boil by interest groups and their lawyers
who make it their business to try to influence or convince agencies. That is why it
is important for administrative law
reformers to try to stay a step ahead by
developing new approaches to decisionmaking.
We are fortunate, however, to have in
the APA a stable framework to guide us
all. One example may suffice to show how
important this is. A major substantive issue
of the 1980's is the extent to which "deregulation" should proceed in various health,
safety and economic regulatory contexts.

The movement toward deregulation began
in the Ford Administration, accelerated in
the Carter Administration and has been
made a top priority of the Reagan Administration, but it still has its detractors. So,
in the early 1980's when several agencies
attempted to repeal regulations, procedural challenges were mounted. After a
series of lower-court skirmishes, the issue
finally came to the Supreme Court in the
context of the Department of Transportation's attempt to repeal its regulation
requiring auto manufacturers to install
airbags or automatic seat belts in all new
cars.
The Supreme Court found that the DOT
action was unlawful primarily because the
Department had failed to consider alternatives to complete rescission. But, of more
long-range importance, the Court expressly
held that promulgations of new rules and
repeals of existing rules are subject to the
same standard ofjudicial review, and that
both types of agency action require the
agency to "examine the relevant data and
articulate a satisfactory explanation for its
action ....
.""Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v.
State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., __
U.S.
103 S.Ct. 2856, 2865-66 (1983).
This decision, while perhaps initially
upsetting to the Administration, was "policy neutral" in that it treated deregulatory
and regulatory actions the same. The decision was consistent with the APA's definition of "rulemaking" as "agency process
for formulating, amending or repealing a
rule," 5 U.S.C. § 551(15). Moreover, once
the Supreme Court reaffirmed the ground
rules, agencies knew what steps to follow
to repeal or amend a rule, and reviewing
courts have applied the same "hard look"
to agency regulatory and deregulatory
actions alike. The result has been that,
while some deregulatory actions have been
overturned by the courts, a substantial
number have been approved.
This is but one indication that, as with
our Constitution, we also have a "living
APA" that can still provide solid answers
to many of the questions invented by today's
administrative lawyers. We should
remember this, and occasionally pause in
our quest for new approaches to fairness
and efficiency to be thankful that our fortyyear-old roadmap still basically shows us
the way.
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